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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENTCOMMERCIAL SPEECH: BROADCASTERS COME UP ALL 7'S:
ADVERTISING OF CASINOS AND GAMBLING
GreaterNew Orleans BroadcastersAssociation v. United States
119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999)
I.

FACTS

The Greater New Orleans Broadcasters Association (GNOBA)'
wanted to broadcast advertisements for "lawful casino gaming" in
Louisiana and Mississippi, where such casinos were licensed as for-profit
businesses. 2 Under some circumstances, however, it was possible that the
advertisements "may be heard not only in Louisiana, but also in adjoining states, including Texas and Arkansas, which [both] prohibit casino
gambling." 3 On February 25, 1994, the GNOBA4 filed a lawsuit in the
Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking to strike down a federal ban of
casino advertising codified in 18 U.S.C. § 13045 and its implementing
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation. 6
The GNOBA asserted that the statute and implementing regulation
violated its right to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 7 The GNOBA first asserted in the district
court that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 did not prohibit the broadcast of advertisements for legal casino gaming. 8 Alternatively, the GNOBA asserted that
I. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S.Ct.
1923 (1999) (No. 98-387). The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association is a "non-profit trade
association representing member television and radio stations in the New Orleans, Louisiana, area in
matters affecting the broadcast industry." Id.
2. See id.
3. See Brief for Respondents at 7, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
1923 (1999) (No. 98-387); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
1923, 1928 (1999) (citing Brief for Respondents, GreaterNew Orleans (No. 98-387)).
4. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, GreaterNew Orleans (No. 98-387).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994). This section provides:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part
upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Each day's
broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense.
Id.
6. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1998). The regulation prohibits the broadcasting of lottery information over "AM, FM, or television broadcast station[s]," but it contains exceptions for state-run lotteries,
fishing contests, and Indian tribe casinos. Id.
7. Brief for Respondents at 8, GreaterNew Orleans (No. 98-387); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." Id.
8. Brief for Respondents at 8, GreaterNew Orleans (No. 98-387).
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the statute violated the First Amendment because it could not pass the
test articulated by the United States Supreme Court for commercial
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission.9
The court entered summary judgment for the government, finding the
disputedlO elements of the Central Hudson test satisfied.11
The GNOBA appealed the district court's ruling to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling. 12 The Fifth
Circuit had occasion to revisit its decisionl 3 and, while considering its
prior opinion in light of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 14 again
affirmed the lower court's ruling.' 5
The Supreme Court granted the GNOBA's writ of certiorari to
resolve the issue 16 and held that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 violated the First
Amendment. 17 Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 could not be applied to the
9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Central Hudson test asks if the commercial speech at issue "concerns lawful activity and is not misleading," if the government's interest in regulating the speech is
"substantial," whether the "regulation directly advances the Governmental regulation," and, finally,
"whether the [regulation] is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The GNOBA also challenged the
constitutionality of the implementing FCC regulation. See Brief for Respondents at 8 n.l., GreaterNew
Orleans (No. 98-387).
10. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975, 979 (E.D. La.
1994). The parties agreed that the "proposed speech would concern lawful activity and not be misleading," thereby satisfying the first prong of the CentralHudson test. Id.
11. Id. The court found that the government had shown a "substantial interest" in "supporting the
policy of nonlottery states," thereby satisfying the second prong of Central Hudson. Id. Further,
relying on United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the court found the third prong of CentralHudson
satisfied because the breadth of the statute was "indistinguishable" from that upheld in Edge. See
GreaterNew Orleans, 866 F. Supp. at 980 (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418
(1993)). The court also "easily" found that Congress had drafted the statute narrowly enough to
satisfy the last prong. Id. at 980-81.
12. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 69 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1995).
13. See id.
14. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
15. See GreaterNew Orleans,69 F.3d at 1302. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but while
the appeal was pending, the Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, which tightened the
CentralHudson test. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-03 (1996) The Court
thus remanded GreaterNew Orleans for reconsideration in light of 44 Liquormart. See Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 519 U.S. 801 (1996). The court of appeals again affirmed.
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 149 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 1998). The court interpreted the
opinion of the Supreme Court concerning the third prong of Central Hudson as requiring "an evidentiary showing" that the government's interest was directly advanced. See id. at 337. The court noted
that Justice Stevens' opinion in 44 Liquormart "did not command majority support on the Court and,
viewed in the context of [44 Liquormart],does not alter this facet of the Central Hudson standard." Id.
Further, even though the fourth prong of Central Hudson "has become a more rigid standard for the
state to satisfy," it did not automatically follow that "[18 U.S.C.] § 1304 [is] broader than necessary" to
meet the government's substantial interests. See id. at 340. The court thus adhered to its original
opinion and found that the district court below was not in error. See id. at 341.
16. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 863 (1999). The Court
also noted that the Ninth Circuit in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998), and a district court in PlayersInternational,Inc. v. United States,
988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997) had come to contrary decisions. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct.
at 1929-30.
17. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1936.
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GNOBA because a prohibition against advertising of private casino gambling fails the Central Hudson test in Louisiana, where such gambling is
legal.18
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

From childhood, most people know that the right to free speech is
guaranteed by the Constitution.19 However, the Supreme Court has ruled
that one may not speak his or her mind on any subject and in any
situation. 2 0 Speech engaged in for the purposes of commercial transactions, advertising, or similar activities has only relatively recently been
21
extended some protection under the First Amendment.
A.

THE STATUS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PRE-CENTRAL HUDSON

The United States Supreme Court did not recognize the right of free
speech in the commercial arena for several decades.22 In 1942, the
Court held in Valentine v. Chrestensen2 3 that commercial speech was
afforded no protection under the First Amendment. In Chrestensen,the
respondent brought suit against the Police Commissioner of New York
City, 24 seeking to prevent enforcement of a city ordinance that prohibit25
ed the distribution of handbills that advertised commercial matters.
Respondent's submarine attraction was the subject of his handbill.26 The
city would allow a handbill to be distributed on the streets only if it dealt
with information of public protest.2 7 To this end, the respondent simply
18. See id.
19. Cf. JAMEs EISENSrEIN ET. AL., PLAY OF POWER: AN INTRODUCION TO AMERICAN GovERNMENT
165 (1996) (citing STUART A. SCHENGOLD, THEPoLiics OFRIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POuCY ANDPOLTCAL CHANGE 62-71 (1974)).

20. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (involving and defining obscenity via a
three-part test that asks: 1) whether material, when taken as a whole and applying contemporary
community standards, "appeals to the prurient interest"; 2) whether the material depicts sexual
conduct in a "patently offensive" way; and 3) whether the material "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (setting out a two-part
test for political expression: a statute that proscribes political speech is constitutional when the speech
is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such lawless action); Chaplinski
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (describing unprotected speech, such as that which
would incite others to action, as "fighting words").
21. See GERALD GUNTHER & KAThLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1175 (15th ed. 1997)
("Before 1976, the Court assumed that most types of commercial speech fell outside the First
Amendment").
22. See generally Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
24. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Chrestensen filed suit against the Police
Commissioner in both his individual and official capacities. Id. at 54.
25. Id. at 53. Section 318 of the New York City Sanitary Code "[forbade] distribution in the
streets of commercial and business matter." Id.
26. Id. at 52-53. Respondent owned a submarine that he moored at a New York Pier and
exhibited for profit. Id.
27. Id. at 53.
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printed a statement, on the opposite side of an advertisement for his
submarine attraction, that protested the decision by a municipal government office to deny him wharf space for his submarine. 28 The question
faced by the Court was whether the ordinance was an infringement on
the respondent's freedom of speech. 29
Speaking clearly and unequivocally for the Court, Justice Roberts
answered in the negative, stating that the Court had never imposed a
restriction or limitation on what legislatures may regulate in regard to
commercial speech. 30 The Court did not view the dispute in terms of
freedom of speech, but rather as involving a proposal for a commercial
transaction. 3 1 It supported its decision not to extend First Amendment
protection to commercial speech by reasoning that the legislature had
the right to regulate business activity on the streets of New York. 32 Here,
the respondent was merely trying to "evade the prohibition of the
ordinance" by attaching his advertisement to his protest. 33
In the years following Chrestensen, the Court distinguished between
pure commercial speech, which received no First Amendment protection,
and speech that was not solely commercial but involved commercial overtones, which was entitled to First Amendment protection. 34 For instance,
in 1964, the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan3 5 rejected an argument
that the First Amendment did not apply when there is commercial speech
involved. 3 6 The issue in New York Times was whether an "editorial
advertisement" critical of public officials in Alabama was libelous. 3 7
The fact that the newspaper accepted paid advertisements and received
28. Id. The ordinance did not prohibit political protest information. Id.
29. Id. at 54.
30. Id. Justice Roberts stated that "the Constitution imposes no... restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising." See id.
31. Id. at 54-55.
32. Id. "The question is ... whether [the New York legislature] must permit such pursuit [of
business] by what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the
highways by the people.., to which the streets are dedicated." IdL
33. Id. at 55.
34. See id. at 54 (1942); see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 n.17 (1966)
(stating in an obscenity case that "[material sold solely to produce sexual arousal, like commercial
advertising, does not escape regulation because it has been dressed up as speech, or in other contexts
might be recognized as speech"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (finding that speech
may be protected even under "commercial auspices"); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
643 (1951) (finding that magazine subscription solicitors' right to speech must be balanced against
homeowner's privacy rights, and that the latter outweighed the former); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 142 n.l (1943) (striking down a statute that prohibited "any person distributing handbills,
circulars or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon
the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements" as not "directed solely at commercial speech" and violating protected
religious speech).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
37. Id.
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monetary compensation for the advertisement at issue did not prevent
the speech expressed from receiving First Amendment protection. 38
This was because the newspaper advertisement expressed an opinion and
concerned ongoing social problems within the country. 39 Thus, the
mere fact that certain speech was contained in an advertisement did not
exclude such speech per se from the protections afforded by the First
40
Amendment.
However, the Court continued to adhere to its doctrine of nonprotection for commercial speech in 1973 in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission.4 1 There, the Court found that
advertisements for employment placed in newspapers were properly
regulated by a Pittsburgh city ordinance 42 that prohibited sex discrimination. 4 3 The Court hinted that had the commercial activity at issue in
Pittsburgh Press not been illegal, 4 4 and had the effects on speech been
incidental to a valid economic regulation, the government's interest in
restricting speech would have been balanced against the interest in commercial free speech in order to determine the ordinance's constitutionality. 4 5 Thus, the Court continued to uphold regulations infringing
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court distinguished its holding in New York Times from that in Chrestensen:
The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the
word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern. (citations omitted) That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is
as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.
Id. at 266; see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 820, 821 (1975).
40. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266.
41. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
42. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 377 (1973).
The ordinance declared that it would be an illegal practice "[flor any 'employer,' employment
agency or labor organization to publish or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any
notice or advertisement relating to 'employment' or membership which indicates any discrimination
because of... sex." Id.
43. Id. at 385. The court in PittsburghPress noted that,
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the Chrestensen rather than the [New York Times v. ] Sullivan advertisement. None expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by
members of one or the other sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the
Commission's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible
employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.
Id.
44. Id. at 389.
45. The court stated:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the Governmental interest supporting
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.
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on speech, and it was not until a line of cases in the middle of the 1970s
that the Court indicated commercial speech would be afforded some
46
type of protection under the First Amendment.
B.

SOME PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH

In 1975, the first in the line of cases affording some First Amendment protection came before the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia.47 In
Bigelow, the Court examined a Virginia statute that prohibited any publication that encouraged women to obtain abortions. 48 The Court rejected
the government's argument that the statute was a valid restriction of commercial speech. 49 The Court again noted that speech was not automatically stripped of its First Amendment protectionSO simply because it was
contained in an advertisement. Further, the activity at issue was legal,51
and the speech involved did not "merely propose[ ] a commercial
transaction," as in Chrestensen,5 2 but was of great public and social
importance. 53 As such, a determination of the constitutionality of the
statute required a balancing of the First Amendment interest against the
purported public interest achieved by the regulation of speech.5 4
The Court found that the statute infringed on the appellant's First
Amendment rights because the interest asserted by the government did
not outweigh the appellant's right to advertise abortions. 55 Perhaps most
importantly, the Court called into question its doctrine of non-protection
for pure commercial speech, noting that its holding in Chrestensen was
limited in scope.5 6 Thus, while not addressing a case in which pure
commercial speech was at issue, all indications were that the Court was
backing away from its doctrine of per se non-protection for commercial
speech.57
46. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
47. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
48. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 813. The statute made it a misdemeanor to encourage abortions "by
publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication." Id. The appellant, a newspaper editor, was convicted under the statute. Id.
49. Id. at 818.
50. Id.; see also PittsburghPress, 413 U.S. at 385.
51. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822. The appellant's newspaper advertised abortions in New York,
where such advertisements were legal. Cf.Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389.
52. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53.
53. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
54. Id. at 827.
55. Id. at 826-27. "The task of balancing the interests at stake here was one that should have
been undertaken by the Virginia courts before they reached their decision. We need not remand...
because the outcome is readily apparent." Id.
56. Id. at 819. Further, the Court noted that Justice Douglas, who was on the Court when it decided Chrestensen, thought that the decision at which the Court arrived in that case was "casual,
almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Id. at 820 n.6.
57. Id.
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One year after Bigelow, the Court in 1976 heard Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.58 The issue
before the Court was whether Virginia could constitutionally forbid its
pharmacists from advertising drug prices. 5 9 The First Amendment challenge was resisted by the state on the grounds that it could prohibit this
type of commercial "information," notwithstanding the decision of the
60
district court.
The question concerning how much protection the First Amendment affords pure commercial speech was squarely before the Court in
Virginia Pharmacy.61 The Court, in its analysis of the issue, found that
since there were difficulties in distinguishing between important commercial messages and those which are not important, a line could not be
62
drawn between the two for purposes of First Amendment protection.
Further, the Court asserted that inasmuch as Americans live in a society
driven by economics, even the most distasteful of commercial advertising
may contain information that is of benefit to the public. 6 3 Assuming
that "information is not in itself harmful," citizens may best achieve
their interests by more information rather than less. 64 This alternative
was better than the "highly paternalistic" 6 5 approach advocated by the
state, because it promoted a more informed consumer. 6 6 Thus, while
finding that there can be limits placed on the protection afforded to
58. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
59. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
749-50 (1976). The statute in question held that a pharmacist was in violation if he or she "publishes,
advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee,
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or
for any drugs which may he dispensed only by prescription." See id. at 750 n.2.
60. Id. at 755. The Court noted that the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
that the interests asserted by the public--knowledge of drug prices--outweighed the state's interests,
such as preserving professional conduct among pharmacists. Id.
61. Id. at 760-61.
62. Id. at 765.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 770.
65. Id. The Court noted that an "alternative [to this paternalism] is to assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them." Id. The Court in later cases would again reject state-sponsored "paternalism" in the
commercial speech context, emphasizing both that consumers should be more, rather than less,
informed, enabling them to make good choices, and that the state should not keep information from
them in an attempt to protect them from bad choices. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia
noted that he joined Justice Stevens' "aversion towards paternalistic governmental polices that prevent
men and women from hearing facts that might not be good for them." See id.
66. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 770.
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commercial speech, 67 as "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation[s] are surely permissible," 6 8 the Court found that the Virginia
statute clearly exceeded these limits. 69 What is not protected under the
guise of commercial speech is information that is false or misleading, 70
speech that proposes an illegal transaction, 7 1 or speech that is a ban on
prior restraint. 72 Then, in 1980, the Court heard Central Hudson, which
set a new standard of protection for commercial speech under the First
Amendment. 7 3

C.

THE CErTRAL HUDSON TEST AND ITS PROGENY

The issue in Central Hudson was whether, consistent with the First
Amendment, the New York State Public Service Commission could regulate the advertising of electric utility companies. 7 4 The appellant, Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, challenged a state court ruling
which upheld the regulation. 75 On appeal, the trial court's ruling was
upheld by the intermediate court of appeals and by the New York Court
76
of Appeals.
67. Id. at 771 n.24. The Court noted:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not
held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense
differences between speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction"
and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial
speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. (citations omitted).
Id.
68. Id. at 770.
69. Id. at 771.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 772; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376.
389 (1973).
72. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772; see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 715 (1931) (explaining that a Minnesota statute that authorized the abatement of certain newspapers was impermissible under the First Amendment). It should be noted that the government may
require additional information be given to consumers. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (requiring a
Surgeon General's warning on all cigarettes imported or distributed in the United States). In addition
to a ban on prior restraint, the Court also later found that the overbreadth doctrine was inapplicable in
commercial speech settings. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) (finding that
the "justification for the application of [the] overbreadth doctrine applies weakly, if at all, in the
ordinary commercial context").
73. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 559
(1980).
74. See id. New York, concerned about the energy crisis in the early 1970s, had implemented
regulations to reduce energy consumption among its citizens. Id. Later, when the energy shortage
eased, the implementing agency, the Public Service Commission, continued the ban on commercial
advertising that promoted use of electricity over the appellant's objection that such regulation infringed on its right of free speech. Id. The Commission allowed informational advertising, but it
continued the ban on advertising intended to promote the sale of electricity. Id. at 560.
75. Id. at 560-61.
76. Id. at 561.
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The Supreme Court, reiterating its position from Virginia Pharmacy, noted that, contrary to the court of appeal's conclusion, commercial
expression serves vital economic and social functions. 7 7 However, com-

mercial speech as such will not automatically be found to invoke the full
extent of the First Amendment protection, because of the "commonsense differences" 78 between speech that proposes a commercial transaction and speech that occurs in an area traditionally subject to
regulation. 79 Thus, a lesser standard of protection applies to commercial
speech. 80
The test for this lower level of protection has become known as the
Central Hudson test. 8 1 This test is a four-pronged inquiry into the regulation of commercial speech to determine its constitutionality: 1) the

speech at issue must not be misleading and must concern a lawful activi-

ty; 8 2 2) the speech or regulation must involve a "substantial government
interest"; 83 3) the "regulation must directly advanc[e] the governmental
interest asserted"; 84 and 4) the regulation must not be "more extensive
85
than is necessary to serve that interest."
The final prong of the test was the "critical inquiry" of the Central
Hudson case itself.8 6 New York was unable to show that a less extensive
and intrusive regulation would be any less effective than the disputed
regulation. 87 The Court reasoned that although the goal of energy
conservation was an important one, there would be no net increase in the
consumption of energy resulting from Central Hudson Gas & Electric's
advertising, since they had a monopoly in the area.8 8 Moreover, under
77. Id. The New York Court of Appeals did not think that advertising in a noncompetitive market, such as electrical service, would serve any societal interest. Id; see also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 765 (finding that "[i]t is a matter of public interest that those decisions [about
economic enterprises], in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable").
78. See supra note 39.
79. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 562; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771
n.24; supra note 66.
80. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
81. Id. at 566.
82. Id. The Court noted that while Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation had a veritable
monopoly on the energy market, the state had conceded that the information to be conveyed was not
illegal or misleading. Id; see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (finding that the speech at issue concerned an illegal activity).
83. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 568. The Court held that New York's "substantial interest"
in conserving energy was beyond doubt. Id. Further, the Court also held that "[tihe State's concern
that rates be fair and efficient represents a clear and substantial governmental interest." Id. at 569.
84. Id. While the regulation at issue directly advanced the state's interest in energy conservation, it did not advance the state's "laudable" interest in equitable rates and energy efficiency. Id.
85. Id. at 566.
86. Id. at 569-70.
87. Id. at 570. "[N]o showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of
promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State's purpose." Id.
88. Id.
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the state's ban, advertising of more efficient means of energy consumption was also banned. 89 It was this part of the regulation that seemed to
propel the Court to hold that the regulation was too extensive to survive
the final prong of the test.9 0 Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment,
expressed displeasure with the Central Hudson test, but he explicitly
rejected the "blanket ban" on commercial speech which the state sought
to impose. 9 1 Thus, because the State had failed to show that a "more
limited speech regulation would be ineffective" to meet the interests
asserted, the regulation violated the Central Hudson test and, therefore,
the First Amendment. 92
In a 1986 case similar to the GNOBA's case, Posadas De Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,9 3 the Court considered a
challenge to a regulation that banned the advertisement of "gambling
rooms" to the public of Puerto Rico. 94 The Court found that the speech
at issue did not concern an illegal activity, so the analysis of the regulation and its constitutionality turned on the last three prongs of the
Central Hudson test. 95
The Court had "no difficulty" with the substantial interest prong.9 6
The Court found that Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in protecting
the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" against the harmful
effects of gambling. 9 7 Further, the question whether the regulation directly advanced the government's interest was unequivocally answered by
the Court in the affirmative. 9 8 Noting that the "fit" between the means
and the ends need only be reasonable, 99 the Court dismissed arguments
that the challenged advertising regulation was underinclusivelOO and
89. Id. Central Hudson Gas & Electric "insists that but for the ban, it would advertise products
and services that use energy efficiently." Id.
90. Id. "To the extent that the Commission's order suppresses speech that in no way impairs the
State's interest in energy conservation the Commission's order violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and must be invalidated." Id.
91. Id. at 583. Justice Stevens did not consider the case to fall under the auspices of commercial
speech, and he therefore did not see the need to decide whether the CentralHudson test would adequately protect commercial speech "as properly defined." See id. Later, it would become evident
that other Justices did not entirely agree with the CentralHudson analysis. See infra note 250.
92. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 571.
93. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
94. See Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 332 (1986).
95. Id. at 340-41.
96. Id. at 341.
97. Id. The Puerto Rico legislature wished to protect its citizens from the harmful effects of
gambling while at the same time promote the use of the casinos by tourists. Id. at 332-33.
98. Id. at 340.
99. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (citing the plurality opinion of
Justice White, which stated that the "third prong of Central Hudson test [is] satisfied where legislative
judgment [is] 'not manifestly unreasonable"').
100. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342. Appellant argued that the advertising restrictions were underinclusive because they allowed other types of gambling, such as cockfighting and horse racing, to be
advertised. Id. The Court rejected this argument on dual grounds. Id. First, the Court stated that not
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found that the legislature's restriction directly advanced its substantial
interest. 10 1
The Court then considered the final prong of Central Hudson and
determined that insofar as the regulation "will not affect advertising of
casino gambling when aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such
advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico,"102 the regulation passed the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 103 The Court
also concluded that since the Puerto Rico legislature could have prohibited casino gambling altogether, then it must surely have the power to ban
advertisement about such casinos. 104 This principle has become known
as the "greater-includes-the-lesser" doctrine. 105
In 1989, three years after Posadas,the Court considered whether a
prohibition on commercial advertising in college dormitories could
withstand First Amendment scrutiny in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox.106 The state university had promulgated
regulations that prohibited commercial enterprises from operating on
campus.10 7 The Court recognized that the speech involved with these
types of commercial enterprises was speech that "propos[es] a commercial transaction" and therefore is subject to the lower level of
protection afforded to commercial speech.10 8 Based on this recognition,
withstanding the broadcast advertisement of other gambling activities, the regulation in question still
directly advanced the substantial interest of the legislature in "reducing demand for games of
chance." Id. Second, the legislature's interest was not in reducing all games of chance, but specifically in reducing demand among citizens of Puerto Rico for casino games of chance. Id. On these bases,
and since the legislature believed that "the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly
greater than those associated [with other traditional Puerto Rican games of chance]," the regulation
was not void due to underinclusivenes. Id. at 342-43.
101. Id. at 341.
102. Id. at 343.
103. Id. The appellant advanced an argument on this point, stressing that the "First Amendment
requires the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino gambling among the residents of
Puerto Rico not by suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such gambling, but by
promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it." Id. at 344. (emphasis original). The Court
rejected this argument, calling it a "counterspeech" policy which was within the legislature's
discretion whether or not to adopt. Id.
104. Id. at 345-46. "In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling." Id.
105. See id.; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996). The Court
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., reinforced the notion that since the government had the
power to prohibit a "vice," it surely had the power to regulate it. United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. and 44 Liquormart later explicitly rejected this
,.vice exception." 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 510; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,482 n.2.
(1995).
106. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
107. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1989).
108. Id. at 473. The respondents argued for the higher level of protection afforded pure speech
not only because the speech at issue concerned commercial transactions but also because it "touched
on how to be financially responsible and how to run an efficient home." Id. at 474. The Court rejected this argument, noting that this speech was not "inextricably intertwined" with other, non-commercial speech, which would afford it heightened protection. See id. (discussing Riley v. National Fed'n
of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
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the Court applied the Central Hudson test and found that the first two
prongs were met. 10 9
As to the third and fourth prongs, that the regulation must directly
advance the governmental interests and be no more extensive than
necessary, the Court rejected the idea that "no more extensive than
necessary" equates with the "least restrictive alternative available." 1 10
The Court reasoned that by focusing on the word "necessary," a lower
court could believe that the more restrictive interpretation of the word
was intended.1 1 1 However, the term was meant to be used loosely,
affording flexibility and not rigidity when applied to commercial speech
cases. 1 12 What is required by the Court is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."113 This
"fit" should be reasonably tailored to accomplish the state's objective
and need not necessarily be the least restrictive available as long as the
"scope is 'in proportion to the interest served."'l 4
The Court applied this "reasonable fit" analysis four years later in
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 115 In Discovery Network,
the respondents sought to advertise their magazines throughout Cincinnati by using newsracks.1 1 6 The city sought to prohibit the advertising
because it considered the magazines commercial handbills, which were
prohibited by city ordinance.11 7 Finding that the speech at issue was
commercial speech, and thus subject to the intermediate level scrutiny of
Central Hudson, the Court applied the four-pronged test from that
case.

118

109. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 475. As to the first prong, the speech involved was not misleading and
proposed a lawful transaction. Id. As for the second, the Court found governmental interests-promotion of "educational rather than commercial atmosphere, safety and security, preventing commercial
exploitation, and preserving residential tranquility"--to be substantial. Id.
110. Id. at 476.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 476-77 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) and discussing
the operation of the word 'necessary' in respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution).
113. Id. at 480 (citing Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
114. Id. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (explaining that the most restrictive means
need not be employed)).
115. 507 U.S. 410(1993).
116. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1993). In Discovery Network, Discovery Network, Inc. advertised its "adult educational, recreational and social
programs" to people in the city and the surrounding area by use of a free magazine, published nine
times a year. See id. at 412. Respondent Harmon Publishing Company also distributed a free magazine, but Harmon advertised real estate for sale across the United States and other real estate-related
matters in the Cincinnati area. Id. at 412-13.
117. Id. at 413.
118. Id. at416.
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Turning to the last prong of the test, the only one disputed by
respondents,1 19 the Court found the regulation not to exhibit the necessary 'fit' between means and end. 120 Since the purpose of the ordinance
was "outdated" and had not "carefully calculated" the benefits to be
derived from such a ban on speech against the costs imposed by restricting speech, the 'fit' was not reasonable.1 2 1 As such, the city's actions
122
ran "afoul of the First Amendment."
One month later, in Edenfield v. Fane,123 the Court was again faced
with the challenge of applying the Central Hudson test. 12 4 In this case,
the commercial speech rights of Certified Public Accountants (CPA's)
were at issue. 12 5 Again, after identifying the speech at issue as commercial 12 6 and noting no problem satisfying the first prong of the test,127 the
analysis focused on whether the regulation was "tailored in a reasonable
128
manner to serve a substantial state interest."
The Court conceded that seeking to protect "consumers from
fraud" and maintain the "independence of CPA's" were substantial
state interests.129 However, the Court stated that the third prong must
now be satisfied by a "demonstrat[ion] that the harms it recites are real
30
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."1
No longer will mere "speculation or conjecture" satisfy this burden.131
The state had not demonstrated that the "ban on CPA solicitation
advances its asserted interest in any direct and material way."1 32 There119. Id. The Court noted, and respondents agreed, that the speech at issue was lawful and not
misleading, and that the city's interest in regulating the speech was substantial. Id.
120. Id. at 417. "There is ample support in the record for the conclusion that the city did not
'establish the reasonable fit we require."' See id. (citing Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
121. Id. at 417-18.
122. Id. at 424. "[T]he city has not established the 'fit' between its goals and its chosen means
that is required by our opinion in Fox." Id. at 428.
123. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
124. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
125. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763-64 (1993). Respondent Scott Fane was a Certified
Public Accountant who wanted personally to solicit clients for his accounting practice. Id. Florida
prohibited such solicitation, and Fane brought suit, seeking to invalidate the anti-solicitation rule on the
grounds that it infringed upon his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
126. Id. at 765. "[lit is clear that this type of personal solicitation is commercial expression to
which the protections of the First Amendment apply." Id.
127. Id. "Fane seeks to communicate no more than truthful, non-deceptive information concerning a lawful commercial transaction." Id.
128. Id. at 767.
129. Id. at 769-70.
130. Id. at 771 (citing Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox., 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989).
131. Id. at 770.
132. ld. at 771.
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fore, the Court struck down the rule because it "infringe[d] upon
[appellant's] right to speak."1 33
In 1995, the Court considered Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,134 the
Coors Brewing Company's case against the Federal Alcohol Administration Act 1 3 5 (Act) in which labeling of alcoholic beverages alcohol
content was claimed to be commercial speech. Coors sought to advertise the content of alcohol on its beer, 136 but it was denied permission to
do So137 because such advertisements would be in violation of the Act. 138
Coors brought suit on the grounds that the Act violated its First
Amendment rights.139
Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, found that one of the state's
two asserted interests 140 was not "sufficiently substantial" 141 to meet the
government's burden under the Central Hudson test. 142 Even though
the state's interest in "protecting the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens" 14 3 from potential alcohol "strength wars" was substantial, 144
the state had not made the requisite showing that this interest was directly
advanced by the Act. 145 This failure was because the Act also required
disclosure of alcohol content on wines and liquor, and as such it could
not be construed as advancing the government's goal of preventing
"strength wars" between brewers.1 4 6 The other asserted interest, assisting state regulation of alcohol, met a similar fate. 14 7 Since there was
no evidence that any states were in need of assistance from Congress on
this issue, this interest necessarily could not be substantial.1 48
133. Id. at 777.
134. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
135. See 27 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). The Act "prohibit[s] disclosure of the alcohol content of beer
on labels or in advertising." See id.
136. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,478 (1995).
137. Id.The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) denied permission. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 478-79. The District Court found that the Act violated the First Amendment, but the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision. Id.at 479.
140. Id. at 483-85. The asserted interests were to curb "strength wars" and to help states
regulate alcohol. Id.
141. Id.at486.
142. See id. The Court also declined to fashion a "vice exception" for alcohol regulation,
because the case could be decided under the auspices of Central Hudson. Id.at 482 n.2.
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id. These "strength wars" could lead to "greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs."
Id.
145. Id. at 488. The "overall irrationality" of the regulation prevented it from directly and
materially advancing the state's interest. Id.
146. Id.at 484. Justice Thomas noted that if the goal of the was to prevent "strength wars." it
"would not pursue the opposite policy with respect to wines and distilled spirits." Id.
147. Id.at 485.
148. Id.at 486.
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The Act also failed the third prong of the Central Hudson test.149
A direct and material advancement of the asserted interest was impossible
because there were other provisions of the Act, such as requiring the
disclosure of alcohol content on liquor and wine, that "undermined and
counteract[ed]" its effects.150 Finally, the Act failed the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test, which requires that the regulation must not
be "more extensive than is necessary" to serve the government's
1
interest. 15
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and again noted that the
government's "paternalistic" desire to mislead consumers in order to
protect them did not, in any situation or context, "justify restrictions on
protected speech."1 52 Thus, he wrote that it did not matter what standard
of scrutiny Court applies when analyzing a speech prohibition, 53 but if
the Court must rely on the "misguided approach" of Central Hudson, 154 then Justice Stevens agreed that the government's interests could
not justify a restriction on speech.155
The Court tightened the Central Hudson test for commercial speech
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.156 In 44 Liquormart, Rhode
Island sought to prohibit the advertisement of liquor prices.157 The
Court struck down the regulation as a violation of the First Amendment. 158 Since the regulation at issue fully and completely banned truthful information that was not illegal or misleading, the Central Hudson
test was to be applied with "special care." 159 Further, the Court required
149. Id. at 488. The "overall irrationality" of the Act made it impossible for it "materially [to]
advance its asserted interest." Id.; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comn'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
150. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489. The proponents of the Act did not convince the Court that the
substantial interest of preventing "strength wars" could be advanced by the ban because, in addition to
the provisions of the Act which mandated disclosure for other types of alcohol, the absence of
"strength wars" for over 60 years in this country could be attributed to "any number of factors" other
than the prohibition on alcohol content on labels. Id. at 490.
151. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Act failed because there were other alternatives
available to the government to advance its asserted interests that were "less intrusive to respondent's
First Amendment rights." See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490. Respondents suggested some such less intrusive
means: 1)direct limitation of beer alcohol content, 2) a ban on marketing efforts that concentrate on
alcohol content, and 3) confining the ban to malt liquors. See id. at 490-91.
152. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 497.
153. Id. at 497-98.
154. Id. at 493; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
155. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 497.
156. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
157. See id.
at 489.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 503 (citing CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9: "We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy"). The
Court noted that while there may be "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and
non-commercial speech, which justify a different level of scrutiny, where the state seeks completely
to ban truthful, nonmisleading speech, "there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:161

a significant showing that the regulation would serve the state's substantial interest. 160 This showing must be made with evidentiary support.161
The Court determined that Rhode Island failed to show any evidence that its ban would significantly advance its interest in promoting
temperance1 62 and that there was a reasonable fit between its goal and the
means by which it sought to achieve this goal. 163 The state argued that
under United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., and Posadas De Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., its regulation was a reasonable exercise of
"legislative judgment" and that its ban would best serve its goal. 164 The
Court rejected this argument because in Edge Broadcastingthe activity
at issue was illegal,16 5 and in Posadas the majority "erroneously
66
performed the First Amendment analysis."1
Thus, after 44 Liquormart, it became clear that the Court would no
longer defer to a state legislature's judgment of what is a substantial
interest.16 7 Further, any interest advanced by the state must be backed
by an evidentiary showing. 16 8 Nevertheless, Central Hudson remains the
169
basic test for commercial speech cases.
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Stevens, writing for eight members of the Court, 170 began the
analysis of the case by noting that the petitioner's case would not be
decided on a new principle of law. 17 1 The Central Hudson test, the
Court found, is the standard under which petitioner's claim could be
resolved.
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the First Amendment generally demands." See id. at 501. Further, even though commercial speech
may be of a more resilient strain than non-commercial speech, this in itself would not justify the
review of a complete suppression of commercial speech "with added deference." See id. at 502.
160. Id. at 505.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 506.
163. Id. at 507.
164. See id. at 508.
165. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1993) (describing the broadcast of lottery information from one state where it was prohibited to a neighboring state
which allowed lotteries).
166. 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 509. While noting that the reasoning in Posadasdid support the
state's argument, the Court was now of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the majority in that
case could not be "reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising where non-speech-related alternatives were available."
Id. at 509-10. The Court also rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument of the Posadas
majority. Id. at 510.
167. Id. at 504-06.
168. Id. at 505.
169. See GuNTHFR & SuLLIvAN, supra note 21, at 1202.
170. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (1999). Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion and Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. 14
171. See id. at 1930. When a narrow ground exists to resolve a dispute, the Court will not "reach
out to make novel or unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional issues." Id.
172. Id. "In this case, there is no need to break new ground. CentralHudson, as applied in our
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CONTENT OF SPEECH IS NOT MISLEADING AND CONCERNS LEGAL
ACTIVITY

17 3
For-profit casino gambling is legal in Louisiana and Mississippi.
The advertising that petitioners proposed to disseminate would accurate174
ly inform listeners about their choices in the gaming marketplace.
Thus, the Court found that notwithstanding the "pecuniary gain" to
petitioners, the interests and benefits conveyed to the public by the
advertising "may be broader" than just economic advantages gained
from more marketplace knowledge.m7 5 Further, the parties agreed that
the advertisements proposed by the petitioner were commercial speech,
and that they satisfied the first prong of Central Hudson.176
more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision." Id. (citing Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The Central
Hudson test asks whether the commercial speech at issue "concems] lawful activity and [is] not
misleading," whether the Government's interest in regulating the speech is "substantial," whether the
"regulation directly advances the governmental interest," and, finally, "whether the [the regulation] is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
173. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:2. 27:15(B)(1) (1999). Section 27:2(A) provides in relevant
part:
The legislature hereby finds and declares it to be the public policy of the state that the
development of a controlled gaming industry to promote economic development of the
state requires thorough and careful exercise of legislative power to protect the general
welfare of the state's people by keeping the state free from criminal and corrupt
elements. The legislature further finds and declares it to be the public policy of the state
that to this all persons, locations, practices, associations, and activities related to the
operation of licensed and qualified gaming establishments and the manufacture, supply,
or distribution of gaming devices and equipment shall be strictly regulated.
See id. Section 27:15(B)(1) states:
The board shall: 1) Have all regulatory authority, control, and jurisdiction, including
investigation, licensing, and enforcement, and all power incidental or necessary to such
regulatory authority, control, and jurisdiction over all aspects of gaming activities and
operations as authorized pursuant to the provisions of the Louisiana Riverboat Economic
Development and Gaming Control Act, the Louisiana Economic Development and Gaming Corporation Act, and the Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law, except as otherwise specified in this Title. Further, the board shall have all regulatory, enforcement, and
supervisory authority which exists in the state as to gaming on Indian lands as provided in
the provisions of Act No. 888 of the 1990 Regular Session of the Legislature and Act No.
See id.; see also MIss. CODE ANN.§§ 75-76-3, 97-33-25 (1972). Section 75-76-3 provides in relevant
part:
(3) The Legislature hereby finds, and declares it to be the public policy of this state, that:
(a) Regulation of licensed gaming is important in order that licensed gaming is conducted
honestly and competitively, that the rights of the creditors of licensees are protected and
that gaming is free from criminal and corruptive elements.
Id.
174. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S.Ct.
1923 (1999) (No. 98-387).
175. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1930.
176. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioners at 10, Greater New Orleans (No. 98-387); Brief for
Respondents at 11, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999) (No.
98-387).
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ASSERTED GOVERNMENT INTEREST IS SUBSTANTIAL

The government advanced two substantial interests 177 in support of
the statute. 17 8 The first of these was to "reduc[e] the social costs
associated with 'gambling' or 'casino gambling."' 17 9 The second was
to "assis[t] states that 'restrict gambling' or 'prohibit casino gambling
within their own borders."'1 8 0 While the Court recognized that these
interests may be characterized as "substantial," it was not willing to say
that they were substantial enough to justify the suppression of casino
advertising. 18 1 The Court found that there were too many exceptions in
18 U.S.C. § 1304182 for the government to defend as relating to a
substantial interest.1 8 3 Further, the Court found that these exceptions
"reflect[] a decision to defer to, and even promote, differing gambling
policies in different States." 184 Therefore, while the Government identified and advanced substantial interests, the Court found that "when [it]
consider[ed] both their quality and the information sought to be
177. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931; Brief for Respondents at 15-16, GreaterNew
Orleans (No. 98-387).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994); Brief for Respondents at 3, Greater New Orleans (No.
98-387).
179. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931; Brief for Respondents at 15-16, GreaterNew
Orleans (No. 98-387) (listing the social costs of gambling: corruption, unwitting bribery, narcotics trafficking, imposition a regressive tax on poor, creation of a false hope of financial advancement, and
growth of organized crime).
180. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931; Brief for Respondents at 15-16, GreaterNew
Orleans (No. 98-387).
181. GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931. The Court noted that whether the state interest in
suppression of casino advertising was substantial was "by no means self-evident." I& But see United
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (stating that "we are quite sure that the Government has a substantial interest in supporting the policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering
with the policy of states that permit lotteries"); Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (stating that the "[I]egislature's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest"). The Court also noted that Congress and
many state legislatures have weighed the social costs associated with casino gambling against the
economic benefits that arise from it. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931. After doing so,
many have allowed casinos to advertise. See id. at 1931 n.5 (noting 11 states allow commercial casino
gambling, and five others-Delaware, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and West Virginiaauthorize video gambling which is itself sponsored by the state).
182. Again, the Court noted that Congress has provided exceptions to the ban on advertising
under 18 U.S.C. § 1304 for state operated lotteries and casinos, and for tribal-run casinos. See
GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931.
183. See id. at 1932. While the Court noted that "it is not our function to weigh the policy arguments on either side of the [debate over commercial casino advertising]," it nevertheless could not
"ignore Congress' unwillingness to adopt a single national policy that consistently endorses either
interest asserted by the Solicitor General." Id.; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 531 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]his Court has examined more searchingly the State's professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it, before accepting a
State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny").
184. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931.

2000]

CASE COMMENT

179

suppressed, the crosscurrents in the scope and application of 18 U.S.C. §
85
1304 [became] more difficult for the Government to defend."1
C.

RESTRICTION DIRECTLY ADVANCES GOVERNMENT INTEREST

The third prong of the Central Hudson test must be satisfied by a
showing by the government that "the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."1 86 This
requirement is of paramount importance,187 and a regulation will only be
upheld if it meets this burden.1 8 8 The Government asserted that 18
U.S.C § 1304 directly advanced two interests; reducing the social costs
associated with gambling, and assisting those states that wished to regu89
late gambling within their borders.1
1.

Directly Advancing First Government Interest-Reducing
Social Costs

The Government asserted that limiting the advertising of casino
gambling, would decrease the demand for gambling and, in turn, would
decrease the social costs associated with gambling.1 9 0 Further, the
Government believed that casino advertisements would have a more
adverse affect on compulsive gamblers than on other portions of the
citizenry. 191
While noting that "more advertising would have some impact on
overall demand for gambling," the Court rejected the Government's
reasoning because it "does not necessarily follow that the Government's
185. Id. at 1932.
186. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 770, 771 (1993)).
187. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 ("[W]ithout this requirement, a State could with ease restrict
commercial speech in the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on
commercial expression"). In Edenfield, the state could not demonstrate that a ban on solicitation by
Certified Public Accountants "advance[d] its asserted interests in any direct and material way." Id. at
771; see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505 (stating that where there was a blanket suppression of
truthful, non-misleading information, the state had the burden of showing that the result of the suppression would result in a significant advancement of the state's interest).
188. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1932 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
189. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1931.
190. See Brief for Respondents at 31, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S.
Ct. 1923 (1999) (No. 98-387). The Government supported this assertion by stating, "The Court has
long regarded the relationship between promotional advertising and consumer demand, and the corresponding effectiveness of promotional advertising restrictions in reducing demand, as axiomatic
matters that do not require evidentiary support." See id. Further, the Government urged the Court to
sustain the regulation based on previous cases in which the Court indicated that, in some circumstances, commercial speech restrictions may be constitutional "solely on [the basis of] history, consensus and 'simple common sense."' Id. at 31-32 (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618. 628 (1995)).
191. Id. at 35. The Government asserted that casino advertising would surprise a compulsive
gambler and entice him or her with flashy, colorful advertising. Id.
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speech ban has directly and materially furthered [the interest in decreasing social costs]" for two reasons. 19 2 First, assuming that gambling
would increase as a result of advertising, 19 3 the Court noted it would be
reasonable to assume that such advertising "would merely channel
gamblers from one casino rather than another." 194 Second, and more
importantly, the Court noted that any effect that the ban on advertising
may have in combating the social costs of gambling is offset by
95
"Congress' simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling."1
This encouragement was a "fundamental flaw" in the Government's case. 196 This flaw manifested itself in 18 U.S.C. § 1304 and the
FCC implementing regulation1 9 7 by exempting tribal casinos, whether
run by the tribe or by a management company hired by the tribe, from
the ban on casino advertising, even if the broadcast carries "to a jurisdiction with the strictest of antigambling policies."19 8 In addition, the
Court found that the FCC implementation and interpretation of § 1304
and § 1307, which outlines exceptions for certain advertisements, "is
squarely at odds with the governmental interests asserted in this case." 199
The Court explained that this conflict exists inasmuch as the FCC allows
broadcasters to advertise "Vegas-style excitement" at a commercial
"casino," if "casino" is part of the establishment's proper name. 20 0 In
addition, the FCC requires that the advertisement can be taken by patrons
to refer to the casino's amenities, rather than directly promote its gaming
aspects. 20
192. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1932.
193. Id. at 1932-33.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1933. Further, the Court noted that the rate of increase of gambling at tribal casinos
"may well be growing at a rate exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that
private casino advertising could produce." Id. "Also as of 1997, about half the States in the Union
hosted Class III Indian gaming (which may encompass casino gambling), including Louisiana, Mississippi and four other States that had private casinos." Id. at 1931 n.5 (citing UWrED STATES GENERAL
AccouNTNG 0 ia, C AsINo GAMmO R EGuLATiON: R OLES oFFrESTATES ANDTE NATIONAL I NDLAN
G AMNO COMMrss oN 4-6 (May 1998)). In addition, the Court noted that advertising among tribal casinos is
commonplace: "One count by the Bureau of Indian Affairs tallied 60 tribes that advertise their
casinos on television and radio." Id. This advertising is big business, amounting to revenue generated
in the amount of $3 billion and comprises "18% of all casino gaming revenue, matching the total for
the casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and reaching about half the figure for Nevada's casinos."
Id.
196. See id. at 1933. The Court declined to address the evidentiary issue of this prong, as urged
by the respondents, because of this fundamental flaw. Id.
197. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1998).
198. Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994); 25 U.S.C. § 2720
(1994) ("[C]onsistent with the requirements of this chapter, sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304 of
Title 18 shall not apply to any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to this chapter"); 47
C.F.R. § 1211 (1999).
199. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The Court refuted the government's argument that its exclusion of
tribal casino advertising from the ban was reasonable because triballyoperated and privately-operated casinos are different. 2 02 Rather, by admitting that private casinos offer the same type of gambling as offered
by tribal or state casinos, the Court found that "the Government presents
no convincing reason for pegging its speech ban to the identity of the
20 3
owners or operators of the advertised [private] casinos."
The Court summarily dismissed a Government-proffered argument
that the two types of casinos were different because of the amount of
regulation to which the two types of casinos are subject and because of
the remoteness of Indian casino locations. 204 As to the latter contention,
the Court first stated that "[i]f distance were determinative [to a casino's
success], Las Vegas might have remained a relatively small community,
or simply disappeared like a desert mirage." 2 05 The former contention
was just as easily rejected, because if heavy regulation of Indian casinos
would serve to cure the social costs of gambling and its advertising, the
Court reasoned, why had Congress not undertaken to experiment with
comparable legislation for private casinos. 206 There are other means, the
Court stated, by which the social costs of gambling could be alleviated
instead of abridging the speech rights of petitioners. 2 07
The Court did note that there is a "special federal interest in protecting the welfare of Native Americans." 2 08 It further noted that there
"may be valid reasons for imposing commercial regulations on
non-Indian businesses that differ from those imposed on tribal enterprises." 20 9 However, this did not "justify infringing non-Indian's
freedom of speech more severely than the freedom of their tribal
competitors." 2 10
In its introduction to the case, the Court also noted other examples,
apart from tribal gaming, that were at odds with the purported interests
202. Id. at 1933-34.
203. Id. at 1934.
204. Id. The respondents argued that "though casinos operated by Indian tribes offer the same
kinds of gambling as private casinos, Indian casinos are heavily regulated and the vast majority of
Indian lands are located in relatively remote and sparsely populated nations." Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. These means include "a prohibition or supervision of gambling on credit; limitations on
the use of cash machines on casino premises; controls on admissions; pot or betting limits; location
restrictions; and licensing requirements." Id.
208, Id.; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1987)
(describing Indian sovereignty and Indian self-government as "important federal interests").
209. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1934.
210. Id. The Court again rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" approach advocated in
Posadas: "For the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the
power to regulate speech." See id.; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S 484, 509-11
(1996).

182
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of the government. 2 1 ' For example, the Charity Games Advertising
Clarification Act of 1988212 and the 1992 Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act 2 13 both "curtailed the coverage of [18 U.S.C.] §
1304."214

The Court also noted that it reached a similar decision in Rubin, in
which a liquor statute was pierced with inconsistencies. 2 15 There, the
Court "considered the effect of conflicting federal policies on the
Government's claim that a speech restriction materially advanced its
interest[s]," 2 16 and found in that case, as in the instant case, that there
was "'little chance' that the speech restriction could have directly and
materially advance[d] its aim, 'while other provisions of the same Act
undermine[d] and counteract[ed] its effects."' 2 17
2.

Directly Advancing Second Government Interest of
Assisting States

The Court also dismissed the government's second interest, assisting
states that have disfavorable policies toward casinos, by noting that if 18
U.S.C. § 1304 could not directly advance a federal interest, then it could
surely not advance any state interest. 2 18 Even assuming that the state
interests were more "coherent" than the federal interests, the Court
211.
212.
(a)
(1)

See Greater New Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1928-29.
18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2) (1999). Section 1307 states:
The provisions of sections 1301,1302,1303, and 1304 shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery conducted
by a State acting under the authority of State law which is -

(B) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or a State
which conducts such a lottery; or
(2) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme other than one described in paragraph (1), that is authorized
or not otherwise prohibited by the State in which it is conducted and which is(A) conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization; or
(B) conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization and is clearly
occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization.
Id.
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994).
214. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1927-28. The Court also noted that § 1307(a) (2),
contains an exemption for casinos operated by state and local governments. Id. at 1928. Further, such
government-operated casinos can broadcast into states where gambling is not permitted and still be
shielded from the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1304. Id.
215. Id. at 1934; see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995) (explaining that
a government regulation which prohibited the advertising of alcohol content on beer while at the same
time allowing alcohol content on wine and other alcohol did not materially advance the government's
interests).
216. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1934.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1935 (emphasis added).
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found that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 sacrificed too much truthful speech to be
upheld. 2 19 By "permitting a variety of speech that poses the same risks
the Government purports to fear, while banning messages unlikely to
cause any harm at all," the government could not convince the Court
that the second interest was any more substantial than the first.220 Thus,
the Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 did not directly advance the two
22
asserted interests of the government. 1
D.

No

MORE EXTENSIVE THAN NECESSARY

Fox, 222

In
the Court noted that while the fit between the "legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends" ' 22 3 need not
be perfect, it should be reasonable "in proportion to the interest
served." 2 24 Further, the means employed are not required to be the least
2 25
restrictive, only "narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."
Applying the Fox standard, the Court in Edge Broadcasting found that
North Carolina had achieved a reasonable fit between the state's interest
in restricting radio advertising by a state licensed radio station of neighboring Virginia's lottery, and the means chosen to effectuate that
restriction. 2 26 However, in 44 Liquormart, the Court found that it was
"perfectly obvious" that the state's interest in promoting temperance
could be achieved by using other less intrusive means than by a ban on
commercial speech. 2 27
In the instant case, the Court also found that there were other means
available to the government which did not infringe on speech to achieve
its interests. 228 While noting that there may be incidental restrictions to
speech pursuant to a valid regulation in support of a substantial governmental interest, the Court decided that Congress had gone too far because the regulation was neither a "rough approximation of efficacy,
219. Id. "Furthermore, even assuming that the state policies [ I are more coherent and pressing
than their federal counterpart, (18 U.S.C.] § 1304 sacrifices an intolerable amount of truthful speech
about lawful conduct when compared to all of the policies at stake and the social ills that one could
reasonably hope such a ban to eliminate." Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
223. See id (citing Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 492 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
224. See id. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
225. See id.
226. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993). The Court stated:
"We have no doubt that the fit in this case was a reasonable one." Id.; see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
227. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996). One way to promote the
state's interest in temperance would be to increase the cost of alcohol by either taxation or direct
regulation. Id.
228. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (1999); see
also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S 476, 490-91 (1995) (finding that where less intrusive and
restrictive alternative means exist, the fourth prong of Central Hudson is not met).
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nor a reasonable accommodation of competing state and private
interests." 2 29 Further, the Court distinguished Edge by noting that, while
a specific governmental interest was identified in that case, the Court
"did not endorse any and all nationwide bans on nonmisleading broadcast advertising related to lotteries." 230 As such, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 failed
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 23 1
The Court noted that "[h]ad the Federal Government adopted a
more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States
that have legalized the underlying conduct, this might be a different
case." 23 2 As it was, the Court found that regulation violated the First
Amendment as applied to the GNOBA and reversed the Fifth Circuit. 233
E.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S CONCURRENCE

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the Court's opinion because
he determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1304 was too full of inconsistencies. 2 34
However, he also stated that had Congress been more substantive in terms
of regulating the gaming industry, instead of regulating advertising of
gambling, then the exemptions in the statute "might well prove [to be]
constitutionally tolerable." 2 35 The Chief Justice noted that legislatures
may perceive of different proportions of evils in the same field and that
they may select one field to regulate while neglecting the others. 2 36
Nonetheless, the regulation of commercial speech falls under the purview
of Central Hudson, and the Chief Justice agreed "that standard has not
2 37
been met here."
F.

JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT

238
Justice Thomas, relying on his concurrence in 44 Liquormart,
stated that where the interest of the government is to keep consumers
ignorant of information, the Central Hudson test should not apply at
all. 2 3 9 Rather, such a prohibition is "per se illegitimate" and cannot
justify a ban on commercial or non-commercial speech. 2 40
229. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1935.
230. Id. at 1935 n.8
231. Id. at 1934.
232. Id. at 1936 (citations omitted).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1936 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
235. Id. The Chief Justice agreed with the Court that there could be some non-speech-related
forms of regulation that would serve to reduce social costs of gambling. Id.
236. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
237. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1936.
238. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996).
239. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1936.
240. Id.
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Thus, while some members of the Court continue to be somewhat
dissatisfied with the Central Hudson test, 24 1 for better or worse, it remains
the test for commercial speech. Even in light of recent tightening of the
test, it will likely continue to guide the Court in its commercial speech
24 2
jurisprudence for years to come.
IV. IMPACT
It appears that under Greater New Orleans, broadcasters may air
advertisements for private, for-profit casinos under protection from the
First Amendment in states where such casinos are legal. 24 3 Further, even
if a state prohibits private casino gambling, it is now unlikely that it
would be able to prohibit neighboring broadcasters from directing
advertising into it.244 Thus, even though the GNOBA's messages could
be heard in states with strict antigambling laws, such as Arkansas and
Texas, 24 5 the Court seemed willing to allow broadcasters to send their
246
casino advertisements into these state's airwaves.
A.

COMMERCIAL CASINO ADVERTISING IN THE FUTURE

However, the Court indicated that in some situations, the govern24 7
ment may be able to justify a regulation on advertising of gaming.
This scenario could materialize if there was a statute that was "more
coherent" than 18 U.S.C. § 1304 or if, in states where casino gambling
is legal, the rights of speakers are adequately protected. 2 48 Thus, if a
policy enacted by Congress to regulate gaming was not permeated
with exemptions which allow some groups to advertise gaming while
restricting others, but rather was a broad sweeping prohibition of gaming
advertising, the Court may find that the regulation complies with the
241. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)
242. Id.
243. See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1936.
244. Id. at 1928.
245. See TEX. PNAI. CODE ANN. §§ 47.02 (West 1999) (criminalizing gambling), 47.03 (criminalizing promotion of gambling), 47.04 (criminalizing keeping a gambling place); ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-66-103 (Michie 1999) (penalizing as a felony the establishment or operation of a gambling house).
246. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1928 (noting that but for the threat of prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. § 1304, the GNOBA would broadcast advertisements of casinos that might be heard in
Texas and Arkansas, which prohibit gambling); see also Brief for Respondents at 7, Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999) (No. 98-387) (stating that under some
circumstances, the radio signals from the GNOBA carry into Texas and Arkansas).
247. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1936. To support this proposition, the Court referred
to United States v. Edge BroadcastingCo., in which it noted that had Congress decided to ban all radio
or television advertisements of lotteries, this would have been a direct advancement of a substantial
government interest. Id. (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993)).
248. Id.
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requirements of Central Hudson and would not violate the First
249
Amendment.
B.

IMPACT ON CENTRAL HUDSON TEST

Even though at least three Justices have expressed displeasure with
the Central Hudson test, 250 it remains the test for commercial speech. 25 1
It is probable that the Court will continue to use the test in the future
because it provides an efficient framework within which to balance the
state's interest against a business's right of free speech. 2 52 To varying
degrees, the members of the Court have recognized the importance of
more information rather than less in the marketplace. 2 53
Accordingly, in the words of one commentator;
From Virginia Pharmacy to GreaterNew Orleans, the Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine has largely been designed
to foster consumer autonomy. As interpreted in the Court's
most recent cases, the First Amendment gives government little
latitude to restrain commercial speech, except for speech that
hurts, rather than helps, consumers' ability to make informed
choices. 2 54
This need for knowledge underscores the probable continued use of the
CentralHudson test. 255
249. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
250. Justice Thomas stated in 44 Liquormart that he would not apply a balancing test such as that
conducted by CentralHudson to cases in which the goal of the government is to "kee[p] would-be
recipients of the speech in the dark." See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 532
(1996). Justice Thomas expressly did not consider whether a balancing test should be used when the
asserted interest of the government was other than to control information. Id. at 491 n.5. Justice
Scalia "share[d] Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson test." Id.
at 517. Justice Scalia
thought that the only support for the test was "nothing more than policy intuition." Id. Justice Stevens,
of course, referred to the Central Hudson test as a "misguided approach," and, in his opinion, the
"four-part test [of Central Hudson] is not related to the reasons for allowing more regulation of
commercial speech than other speech." See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S 476, 493 (1995).
251. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("[S]ince I do not believe we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central Hudson
wrong-or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to replace it-I must resolve this case in accord
with our existing jurisprudence").
252. Cf 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting that, in an area as broad as "freedom of speech" and excluding political speech, he
would prefer to make decisions on what regulations are prohibited by the Constitution from the "long
accepted practices of the American people").
253. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (Thomas, J.); Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (Kennedy, J.); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 582 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
254. See Erik Bierbauer, Note, Liquid Honesty: The FirstAmendnent Right to Market the Health
Benefits of ModerateAlcohol Consumption, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1057, 1085 (1999).
255. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1930 (stating that Central Hudson provides an adequate method to decide the present case); see also 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the cases after CentralHudson require the Court to "take
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1.

Continued Adherence to Requirement of Evidentiary
Showing that Regulation Directly Advances Government
Interest

While the Court did not directly address the requirement of an
evidentiary showing in GreaterNew Orleans because it was not necessary
in order to decide the case, 2 56 there is no indication that the Court will
not continue to require an evidentiary showing by the government that
its substantial interests will be directly and materially advanced when it
seeks to regulate commercial speech. Wherever wholesale suppression of
truthful and nonmisleading information is the goal of the government,
2 57
the need for this evidentiary showing is "particularly great."
2.

Continued Interpretationof "No More Extensive Than
Necessary" in Light of Fox

As noted in Fox, the means that the government uses to advance
its substantial interests need not be the most restrictive available, but
they must be reasonable and in proportion to the interests that are
asserted. 2 58 The Court further explained in Discovery Network that "if
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the
restriction on commercial speech," that is a factor to consider in determining whether the fit between the means and ends is reasonable. 2 59 The
Court reaffirmed this interpretation in Greater New Orleans.2 60 As
Justice O'Connor noted in 44 Liquormart, the Court will now "more
searchingly" examine the government's goal and the means by which
a closer look" at government regulations and noting that this "comports better with the purpose" of the
CentralHudson test). However, some commentators have argued for disregarding the CentralHudson
test and affording all commercial speech First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Brian J. Waters,
Comment, A Doctrinein Disarray: Why the FirstAmendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech. 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1649 (1997). However, the
Court may be hard pressed to develop a replacement test that is as predictable and readily applicable
to other commercial areas, such as tobacco advertising. See Diane Ritter, Note, The FirstAmendment,
Commercial Speech, and the Future of Tobacco Advertising After 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode
Island., 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1505, 1532 (1997) (discussing the application of the CentralHudson test to
tobacco advertising regulations found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.1-.34 (1996) (effective Aug. 28, 1997)).
Indeed, one commentator has noted that the Court has recently signaled "a clear desire.., to maintain
a narrow and stringent standard of First Amendment review for commercial speech restrictions by
way of the Central Hudson test." See id.
256. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933. "We need not resolve the question whether
any lack of evidence in the record fails to satisfy the standard of proof under Central Hudson,
however, because the flaw in the Government's case is more fundamental." Id.
257. See 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 505.
258. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citing
Posadas De Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S 328, 341 (1986); In re R.M.J, 455 U.S 191,
203 (1982)).
259. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993).
260. See GreaterNew Orleans,119 S. Ct. at 1932.
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it reaches that goal. 2 6 1 This approach to the analysis under this prong
was thought to "better comport" with the commercial speech analysis of
Central Hudson.2 62
C.

APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA LAW

1.

Charitable Gaming

Under North Dakota law, gambling is legal when it is conducted by
nonprofit fraternal, charitable, or other "public-spirited organizations." 2 63 A federal statute specifically exempts advertising of gaming
that is conducted by non-profit organizations from the penalties of 18
U.S.C. § 1304 when authorized by the state. 2 6 4 The impact on
non-profit organizations who conduct charitable gaming in North
Dakota would be greater if the state allowed private casinos to be run for
profit, because under Greater New Orleans, such casinos would be
permitted to advertise, and, as a result, non-profit casinos could possibly
see their gamblers migrate to the private casinos. 2 65 Indeed, the Court
noted that this "channeling of gamblers from one casino [to] another"
was a reasonably foreseeable outcome from more gambling. 2 66 However, since private casinos are not allowed, the impact of Greater New
Orleans on such non-profit organizations in North Dakota will be slight,
if any.
2.

Native American Casinosand Advertising

Native American gaming is allowed in the state pursuant to federal
because North Dakota allows nonprofit gambling to exist in the

law, 2 67

261. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
262. Id. at 531-32.
263. See N.D. CONsT. ART. XI § 25. It provides that:
The legislative assembly shall not authorize any game of chance, lottery, or gift
enterprise, under any pretense, or for any purpose whatsoever. However, the legislative
assembly may authorize by law bona fide nonprofit veteran's, charitable, educational,
religious, or fraternal organizations, civic and service clubs, or such other public-spirited
organizations as it may recognize, to conduct games of chance when the entire net
proceeds of such games of chance are to be devoted to educational, charitable, patriotic,
fraternal, religious, or other public-spirited uses.
Id.
264. See 18 U.S.C § 1307 (a)(2)(A) (1994).
265. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1932-33.
266. See id.
267. 25 U.S.C § 2701 (1994). The statute states:
The Congress finds that(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if
the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a
State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
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state. 26 8 All five of the Native American tribes in North Dakota operate
casinos. 269 Further, because 18 U.S.C. § 1304 does not apply to Indian
tribes, 2 70 advertising on television, radio, and billboards of tribal run
casinos is already widespread in the state. 27 1 Thus, the ruling in Greater
New Orleans will probably not have a great impact on tribal casino
gambling. 272
3.

Future of Advertising for Private, For-ProfitCasinos in
North Dakota In Light Of GreaterNew Orleans

The impact of GreaterNew Orleans could be substantial for private,
for-profit casinos. However, for the decision to have any impact on
private, for-profit casinos in North Dakota, the legislature would have to
extend statutory protection for such casinos to exist in the state, and at
present, it has not. 2 73 If the state does extend protection to private,
for-profit casinos, then North Dakota could not prohibit the radio or
activity.
Id.
ART. XI, § 25. It provides:
The legislative assembly shall not authorize any game of chance, lottery, or gift enterprise, under any pretense, or for any purpose whatsoever. However, the legislative
assembly may authorized by law bona fide nonprofit veteran's, charitable, educational,
religious, or fraternal organizations, civic and service clubs, or such other public-spirited
organizations as it may recognize, to conduct games of chance when the entire net proceeds of such games of chance are to be devoted to educational, charitable, patriotic,
fraternal, religious, or other public-spirited uses.

268. See N.D. CONST.

Id.
269. See Tribes, Schafer Sign Gambling Agreement, AP NEwswiREs, Sept. 29, 1999, available in
Westlaw NDNEWS database.
270. 25 U.S.C § 2720 (1994). The statute reads: "Consistent with the requirements of this chapter, sections 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304 of Title 18 shall not apply to any gaming conducted by an
Indian tribe pursuant to this chapter." Id.
271. Among those that advertise are Spirit Lake Casino & Lodge in Devils Lake, North Dakota,
Prairie Knights Casino, near Cannonball, North Dakota, and Dakota Magic Casino near Wahpeton,
North Dakota. Telephone interview with Barret DeFay, Corporate Marketing Director, Dakota Magic
Casino (Nov. 1, 1999). In addition, in the eastern portion of the state, Minnesota tribal casinos such as
Shooting Star Casino in Mahnomen and River Road Casino in Thief River Falls advertise in North
Dakota. Id.
Dakota Magic Casino advertises on a "quite widespread basis" and is among the top 10 customers of local and regional radio stations. Dakota Magic Casino dedicates over $50,000 per month on
advertising in radio, television and billboards. Id. The Shooting Star Casino spent over $40,000 per
month in 1995 on the same type of advertising. Id. In addition, over $80,000 was spent by the Shooting Star Casino in a Fargo, North Dakota newspaper on advertising in a single year. Id. This does not
include the funds that are spent on promotions, direct mail, or other similar advertising schemes. One
defense offered for the large amounts spent by these casinos is that the funds are spent as a function
of geography; that is, because of the nature of the sparse, spread out population in North Dakota and
eastern Minnesota, casinos must channel large amounts into advertising to reach customers who live in
rural areas. Id. In addition, tribal casinos are usually not near large or medium size cities, and therefore must also advertise heavily. Id.
272. See 25 U.S.C § 2701 (1994).
273. See N.D. CENT CODE § 12.1-28-02(1) (1999) "It is an infraction to engage in gambling on
private premises where the total amount wagered by an individual player exceeds twenty-five dollars
per individual hand, game, or event." Id.
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television advertising of such casinos consistent with the First Amendment under GreaterNew Orleans.274 There is a possibility that, if some
private, for-profit casinos open in the states that neighbor North Dakota,
the state would be powerless to prevent such casinos from directing their
advertising toward North Dakota from a border broadcast location. 2 75
Thus, until such time as there are private, for-profit casinos operating in North Dakota, it appears that GreaterNew Orleans will not directly
impact the state in a significant manner. 2 76 However, that is not to say
that the Court's continued use of the tightened Central Hudson test in
GreaterNew Orleans will not affect the state at all. 27 7 Indeed, commercial speech in North Dakota and the United States will probably continue
to enjoy substantial protection under the First Amendment in the
8
future. 2 7
27 9
Joseph A. Wetch, Jr.

274. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1923 (1999).
275. See id. at 1928. The Court did not seem concerned that the GNOBA's casino advertising
could, in certain circumstances, be heard in states such as Texas and Mississippi, which prohibit casino
gambling. Id. This may indicate that the Court would allow advertising to invade North Dakota from a
neighboring state that allows casino gambling. Id.
276. See N.D. CENT CODE § 12.1-28-02(1) (1999) (criminalizing private gambling over $25).
277. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1935-36. The Court did not find that the government
had directly and materially advanced its interest, as it now requires after 44 Liquormart. Id.; see also
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996). Further, Justice Stevens noted that
there is a presumption, with which the full Court apparently agrees, that the "speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful conduct." GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1935-36. Thus, the Court seems to be
signaling that it will not uphold laws in the future that continue to think for consumers, instead of
allowing them to think for themselves. Id. However, the Court did hint that "[h]ad the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States that have
legalized the underlying conduct.. . this might be a different case" Id. at 1936. Further, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his concurrence, signaled that he would be probably willing to allow a speech restriction
where Congress engaged in "substantive regulation of the gaming industry, rather than simply the
manner in which it may broadcast advertisements, 'exemptions and inconsistencies' such as those in
[18 U.S.C.] § 1304 might well prove constitutionally tolerable." Id.
278. See GreaterNew Orleans, 119 S.Ct. at 1935-36 ("Accordingly, respondents cannot overcome the presumption that the speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess
the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful conduct"); see also Ritter, supra
note 255, at 1532.
279. 1 wish to thank my wife, Lori, for her love, support, and understanding during the writing of
this comment. I also wish to thank my parents for their love and encouragement.

